Matching problems with preferences occur in widespread applications such as the assignment of school-leavers to universities, junior doctors to hospitals, students to campus housing, children to schools, kidney transplant patients to donors and so on. The common thread is that agents have preference lists over the possible outcomes and the task is to find a matching of the participants that is in some sense optimal with respect to these preferences.
The time is right, therefore, for a special issue of a leading journal to focus on matching problems with preferences, with particular emphasis on the algorithms and complexity perspective. We solicited papers studying matching problems including (but not limited to) bipartite matching problems with preference lists on both sides (such as the Stable Marriage or Hospitals/Residents problems), bipartite matching problems with one-sided preferences (such as house allocation or paper assignment problems) and non-bipartite matching problems involving preferences (such as the Stable Roommates problem), under optimality criteria such as stability, rankmaximality, popularity and Pareto optimality.
This special issue includes selected papers from the workshop "Match-UP: Matching Under Preferences-Algorithms and Complexity" that were invited for submission to this issue of Algorithmica. The Match-UP workshop was held in Reykjavík on 6 July 2008 as a satellite workshop of ICALP 2008 and was very well attended, attracting excellent invited and contributed talks. The opening talk at the workshop was to have been given by one of the key pioneers in the field, Professor David Gale, of the University of California, Berkeley. Sadly, David Gale died suddenly on 7 March 2008, while preparations for the workshop were under way. We are honoured to dedicate this special issue to his memory.
Six papers that are fully revised and extended versions of earlier submissions to the Match-UP workshop were invited for submission to this special issue. In addition, the remaining six papers that appear here were submitted in response to a general call for papers that was issued shortly after the workshop (and not restricted to authors who had participated in the Match-UP workshop). All submissions were fully refereed to the usual standards of Algorithmica. We were delighted with the response (in terms of both quality and quantity) to both our paper invitations and the more general call for submissions, and feel that the twelve papers appearing in this special issue constitute an excellent snapshot of the current state of the art regarding research in the field.
A brief summary of the twelve papers appearing in this special issue follows.
• In "Three-Sided Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences", Péter Biró and Eric McDermid consider the three-sided extension of the Stable Marriage problem (featuring men, women and dogs) in which preference lists are cyclic in nature, and show that it is NP-complete to determine whether a stable matching exists, for two stability criteria.
• Housing markets in which some agents' houses are equivalent are considered by Katarína Cechlárová and Tamás Fleiner in "Housing Markets Through Graphs". They show that, in this context, determining whether an economic equilibrium exists is polynomial-time solvable for strict preferences, but NP-complete for socalled trichotomous preferences. Dean answer an open question of Gusfield and Irving [1] by demonstrating that a set of matchings in an instance of the Stable Marriage problem with n men and n women can be checked for stability in time sub-quadratic in n (following sufficient pre-processing). Matchings in Marriage Games", Jun Wako gives an O(n 2 ) algorithm for finding a man-optimal matching and a woman-optimal matching in a von NeumannMorgenstern stable set for a given instance of the Stable Marriage problem with n men and n women.
The guest editors would like to thank all of the contributors for their work. We would also like to thank the referees for their detailed and timely reviews. In addition,
